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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PAUL BRAMEL and WILLIAM B. BROOKS, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
-vs-
THE ST ATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
11479 
This is a review of an ordinary negligence action tried to 
the court below on a question of warning to motorists with 
reference to the freeway (l-15) ending at or near Ogden, Utah, 
and contributory negligence of the driver which resulted in 
Judgment for the Plaintiffs, Respondents, and against the 
Defendant, Appellant, State of Utah. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 29th day of November, 1966, at approximately 
8:00 p.m., a 1966 Kenworth Diesel Tractor with a 1963 Trail-
mobile refrigerated trailer unit failed to negotiate the off-
ramp at the ending of I-15 at or near Ogden, Utah, and the 
unit overturned resulting in considerable damage to the tractor 
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and trailer unit, and to the cargo of cucumbers, and some in-
jury to the person of the driver of the tractor, William B. 
Brooks, one of the Respondants. 
Some four to five hours earlier, Mr. Brooks had left Price, 
Utah after a rest stop (R-57) on a planned Houston, Texas 
to Spokane and Seattle, Washington haul (R-54). As he 
traveled I-15 there had been some patches of fog (R-58) but 
near and at the point of the accident, the fog had lifted 
(R-58), and visibility was at least 20 - 25 yards (R-76 and 
80). 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The lower court found that the signs placed by the State 
of Utah "gave virtually no warning to the motorist public ... 
(so) that they would be able to negotiate with reasonable safe-
ty the exit at the freeway end" (R-31) ; that the driver 
Brooks was free of contributory negligence (R-3 2) and award-
ed judgment to the Plaintiffs for property damage and personal 
injury in the sum of $27,878.2 5, including interest, together 
with costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek an Order of this Court reversmg the 
judgment of the court below and dismissing the action of the 
Plaintiffs as a matter of law, or in the alternative remanding 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT "AT 
MOST" ONLY CERTAIN LISTED SIGNS HAD BEEN IN 
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PLACE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT IS ERRON-
EOUS, AND CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
A complete reading of the transcript of the Trial fails 
to disclose the evidentiary testimony from which the court 
made the Findings of Fact, paragraph 5 (R-31). If the testi-
mony of the Plaintiff, Brooks, is credited, there were only 
four or five Chevron signs "back up the road" (R-64) and 
one EXIT 2 5 MILES PER HOUR sign "just before you went 
off onto the off-ramp" (R-65). The court having apparently 
found that there were other signs up, appears not to have 
credited the testimony of the driver Brooks on this point. The 
clear testimony of the State's witnesses as to the signing of 
the area prior to the opening of the freeway section involved, 
on the other hand, appears to have been only partially credited 
by the court. It does not clearly appear what basis the court 
used in ascertaining the facts in this regard, accepting some of 
the testimony and rejecting other evidence on the matter of 
signs from the same witnesses. As stated in the Findings of Fact 
(R-31), the following signs "at most" were up: 
Freeway Ends One Mile 
All Traffic Must Exit 
2 5 Miles per Hour speed signs (black on yellow) - two 
Chevron channelizing signs (red and white) - several 
Unlighted Barricades (black on white) 
2 5 Miles per Hour Exit speed sign (black on yellow) 
Yellow arrow at north edge of exit 
It is respectfully submitted that other than the very gen-
eral testimony of Brooks, (obviously not accepted by the court 
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below) that no signs were up at all except the Chevron signs 
and the one 2 5 MILES PER HOUR sign, there is no dispute 
in the record that the following signs were also in place at the 
time of the accident: 
Single Lane Ahead (R-146 and 147) 
Black on yellow arrow (additional) (R-150 and 169) 
In addition, it should be noted that the evidence clearly shows 
that nearly all of these signs were reflectorized (R-145-147). 
The existence of the SINGLE LANE AHEAD sign is 
deemed to be of particubr importance. Through an extended 
period of cross-examination, the driver Brooks insist that the 
freeway went from three lanes to two lanes and then directly 
to the off-ramp never h:iving narrowed to a single lane (R-76-
78). This is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, and 
to the exhibits P-1, P-2, and P-4. In finding, therefore, that 
"the State failed to give adequate, reasonable or sufficient 
notice ... that traffic would be required to turn on to a one 
lane ... exit road ... " (R-31) the failure of the court to 
find that this sign was erected is not only erroneous, but re-
versible error. It is urged that when the actual number, type 
and condition of signing clearly in place at the time of the 
accident is recognized, the further finding of the court be-
low and the judgment rendered thereon, is error as a matter 
of law. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING ON THE EVIDENCE 
THAT THE SIGNS AS PLACED BY THE STATE FAILED 
TO GIVE ADEQUATE, REASONABLE OR SUFFICIENT 
NOTICE, AND IN FACT GAVE VIRTUALLY NO WARN-
ING. 
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At first blush, the issued would appear to be a strictly 
factual consideration. However, the importance of this issue 
has been statutorily realized in 41-6-20 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, wherein it is required that "The State Road Commis-
sion shall adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform 
system of traffic control devices consistent with the provisions 
of this act for use upon highways within the state. Such a 
uniform system shall correlate with and so far as possible, con-
form to the system then current as approved by the American 
Association of State Highway Officials." To comply with this 
statutory mandate, the commission follows the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Dei,ices for Streets and Highways 
prepared by the American Association of State Highway Offi-
cials et al.(l) The record shows that there was conformity with 
the minimum requirements plus some additional signing ac-
cording to testimony (R-130 and 131). 
Turning from the statutory requirements incorporated in 
41-6-20 U.C.A. 1953 to the case law briefly, the general rule 
is that a governmental highway authority is not negligent in 
failing to erect and maintain warning signs or barriers unless 
(a) the situation is inherently dangerous, or (b) such signs 
or barriers are specifically required by statute. Ulve vs. City 
of Raymond, 317 P 2d 908, 51 Wash. 2d 241 (1957). Con-
cluding that the present situation is an inherently dangerous 
situation, the degree of required signing devices would cer-
tainly not exceed that which reasonably prudent men would, 
under the same or similar circumstances, consider to be suf-
ficient. We submit that the basic standards followed in the 
(I) Institute of Traffic Engineers, National Committee on Uniform 
Traffic Laws and Ordinances, National Association of County Offi-
cials, American Municipal Association; published by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Washingtno D.C., 
June, 1961. 
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manual cited supra, should, as a matter of law, be sufficient 
to constitute an appropriate warnmg for a non-negligent 
driver. 
We further submit that to determine the adequacy or in-
adeuacy of the signing, the court must look only at the evi-
dence directly relevant to that issue. The court should not 
speculate as to better methods of warning motorists nor should 
it consider subsequent additions to the signing or structuring 
of the roadway. It should limit its consideration to the issue 
of whether a careful user would be secure under the present 
circumstances. Shipley vs. City of Arroyo Grande, 208 P 2d 
51, 92 C.A. 2d 748, (1949). Additional evidence such as in-
toxication of the driver or driving record, etc., would lend 
evidence to the probabilities of an accident, but would add 
nothing to the issue regarding the adequacy of the signing per 
se. We would therefore suggest that there were ample signs to 
warn a reasonably careful driver and the instant case should 
lead to a remlt in harmony with such a conclusion. In Nelson 
vs. City of Seattle, 16 Wash. 2d, 592, 134 P 2d, 89, ( 1943), 
the court said that one sign, having the dimensions of three 
feet by five feet, with the wording "danger ... when wet ... 
speed 15" was sufficient, as a mattter of law, for the court 
to conclude that the city was free from negligence in warning a 
motorist of the danger of the up-coming wooden block pave-
ment. 
Therefore, the number of signs and the spacmg thereof, 
mentioned above, would be sufficient to warn the reasonable 
driver of pending danger and would certainly be contrary to 
the finding of the court that there was "virtually no warning 
to the motorist public". 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DRIVER, 
BROOKS, OPERATED THE UNIT IN A REASONABLE 
AND PRUDENT MANNER. 
Except for the self-serving statements of Plaintiff Brooks 
(R-65) which is contradictory to his previous testimony, as the 
record clearly shows (R-64 and 65), all of the competent, 
believable evidence, and particularly the physical facts not in 
dispute, argue persuasively for a finding of negligence on the 
part of Brooks as a matter of law. Elsewhere in this Brief, it 
is pointed out that between one mile of the off-ramp and the 
off-ramp in question, the State of Utah was found by the 
court to have erected some ten or more warning and informa-
tion signs regarding the ending of the freeway and the exit 
speed, etc., in connection with this highway. The Plaintiff 
Brooks insists that he didn't see any signs except the Chevron 
signs and the last 2 5 MILES PER HOUR exit sign (R-64 
and 6 5) . In view of the courts finding that there were at least 
twice that many signs in place, the driver, Brooks, stands con-
victed on his own testimony of having failed to see what was 
there to be seen, ::md thus of negligence as a matter of law. 
We urge that it is not within the realm of logic that a person 
driving in a "reasonable and prudent manner" (R-31-32) 
would have seen the signs which are found to have been in 
place and still failed to negotiate the off-ramp in question. The 
whole import of the signs which were found to be in place 
is that conditions ahead were changing and adverse, requiring 
a relatively dow speed of 2 S miles per hour from the freeway 
speed of 70 miles per hour. What do three signs EXIT 2 5 
MILES PER HOUR mean? And what do the other warning 
signs mean? 
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This court has heretofore held that "where the undisputed 
facts are of such a character that reasonable minds c:m arrive 
at but one conclusion, namely that the injured party was not 
exercising the degree of care imposed by law, it is the duty 
of the court to declare such conclusion as a matter of law". 
(Edmunds vs. Germer, 12 Utah 2d 215) (see also Frank vs. 
McCarthy, 188 P 2d 737, 112 Utah 422 ( 1948) on this point). 
We urge that the court below, having found the State to have 
erected some ten or more warning and informational signs 
within one mile of the off-ramps was bound by that finding 
to declare the failure of the driver to see and act upon the in-
formation thus disclosed to be negligent as a matter of law un-
der the rule of the referenced case. In that same opinion, this 
court stated: 
"The law not only places upon a driver of an auto-
mobile the responsibility of seeing things which are 
apparent, but charges him with the consequences of 
failing to see what, in the exercise of ordinary care, 
he should have seen". 
In connection with the exit speed sign we submit, fur-
ther, that on the record the Pbintiff Brooks again stands con-
victed of negligence primarily upon his own testimony. Brooks 
testified that visibility at the point of the accident was 20 - 2 5 
yards, because "I was running with my lights on dim" (R-76 
and 80). Yet in prior testimony on direct examination, Brooks 
admitted that he did not see the sign, indisputably there to be 
seen, until he was 20 to 25 feet from it (R-66) ! These facts are 
totally inconsistent with the finding that Brooks was driving 
in a "reasonable and prudent manner", but are strongly in-
dicative of the reverse. 
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Taking the facts as we find them, there is a clear show-
ing in the testimony that Brooks was negligent in connection 
with this action on further grounds. The undisputed testimony 
of the State (R-146) and the physical facts as they are dis-
closed by exhibits P-1 and P-4 is that the last EXIT 25 MILES 
PER HOUR sign was placed approximately 50 feet from the 
exit. Throughout his testimony, Brooks insists that he was not 
exceeding 3 5 miles per hour as he approached the exit (R-58 
and 7 6) and on cross-examination, he reduced this maximum 
speed to 32 miles per hour because "I was taching about 1800" 
(R-90). It is respectfully submitted that with approximately 
7 5 feet to go before the exit, no driver driving reasonably and 
prudently at a speed not in excess of 3 5 miles per hour, would 
have any difficulty whatsoever in reducing his speed by 7 to 10 
miles per hour. 
Exhibits P-1 and P-4, taken after the accident, show con-
vincingly that Brooks didn't even try to make the turn off, 
but rather ran off the ramp almost immediately. It flies in 
the face of reason to suppose that a person driving a motor 
vehicle in a reasonable and prudent manner, keeping a look-out 
for warning and directional signs, can be traveling at a rate 
of not to exceed 3 5 miles per hour, observe a sign requiring an 
exit speed of 2 5 miles per hour some 7 5 feet before the need, 
and still fail not only to negotiate the roadway safely, but in 
fact to run off it immediately! Add to this the testimony of 
the driver Brooks that he did not skid any wheel before the 
overturn (R-67) and an incontrovertible case of negligence is 
made out against the plaintiffs. The only logical conclusion 
from the evidence is that Brooks either failed to see what was 
there to be seen, or failed to consider and act non-negligently 
on what he saw. In this connection, it is submitted that there 
is some differential for safety over and above the posted min-
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imum, allowing safe vehicular negotiation of our highways 
with speeds somewhat higher than posted, particularly when, 
as here, the driver is ::t professional, with a modern, well 
equipped motor vehicle. Accepting the testimony of the driver, 
Brooks, at face value, he should have been able with no diffi-
culty at all to negotiate the turn-off from I-15 with perfect 
safety, and his failure to do so was conclusive evidence of his 
negligent and careles'> operation of his motor unit which was the 
proximate, if not the sole cause of the Plaintiffs damages. 
POINT IV 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE DRIVER, BROOKS, BARS 
ANY RECOVERY BY THE DRIVER OR HIS EMPLOYER, 
OWNER OF THE DAMAGED UNIT, FROM THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
It is well settled that an employer, owner of a motor 
vehicle who releases the motor vehicle to his employee and sends 
him out on the business of the employer is barred from re-
covery for any loss or damages to his property, vehicle, and 
cargo, where the negligence of the employee, is in any degree 
a contributing factor in the damages or loss. (Frank vs. Mc-
Carthy, 188 P 2d 737, 112 Utah 422 (1948); Portre vs. Saun-
ders, 143 P 2d 554, 19 Wash. 2d 561 (1943); Bailey vs. Jef-
fries - aves, Inc., 414 P 2d 503, 76 N. M. 278 (1966). 
Indeed, this court has stated in a dictum, that an employer 
may be held answerable in damages for the intentional tort of 
his employee committed in the furtherence of his employer's 
interest or (where) the employment is such that the use of 
force could be contemplated in its accomplishments. Barney vs. 
Jewel Tea Company, 104 Utah 292. Had the State of Utah 
filed a counterclaim for damages to the property of the state 
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destroyed by the negligence of Brooks, it would have been 
entitled to recover any judgment rendered thereon against 
both Brooks and his employer, Bramel, in the instant case. 
The rule of respondeat superior is clearly and properly in-
voked in this connection, so that if the driver Brooks is guilty 
of negligence, neither he nor his employer may recover for 
damages to which such negligence has been in any degree a 
cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Respondents, it is clear that the State of Utah, Department of 
Highways was not negligent in any particular as it relates to 
this action. The court found some ten or more reflectorized 
signs placed by the state within one mile of the exit from the 
freeway (R-31). The nature of the signs together with the 
numbers, completely negates any reasonable finding of negli-
gence on the part of the Appellant, State of Utah. The un-
controverted evidence is that the section of highway was signed 
in compliance with the Manual on Traf fie Control Devices 
as approved by the American Association of State Highway 
Officials and as required by 41-6-20 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
Indeed, the evidence justifies a finding that the signing of this 
area exceeded the standards so established, which must be 
deemed prima facie evidence of no negligence. There being ab-
solutely nothing in the record to rebut this presumption, it is 
submitted that the State of Utah was not and could not be 
liable for negligence. 
In any event, the State of Utah can not reasonably be 
required to respond in damages to the Respondents because 
the record is conclusive that on the testimony of the Plaintiff 
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driver, Brooks, he was negligent as a mattter of law. Also, 
as a matter of law, his negligence as an employee of the other 
Respondent, owner of the motor unit, acting clearly within the 
scope of his employment, serve to bar recovery from the Ap-
pellant, State of Utah. 
It is submitted, therefore, that justice demands this case 
be reversed and that judgment of dismissal be entered in favor 
of the Appellant, State of Utah, as a matter of law, or in the 
alternative, remanded for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, ESQ. 
Attorney General 
MARK A. MADSEN, ESQ. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
